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Jucrgcn Habermas has recently made considerable strides in his 
understanding of the operations of late-capitalism and the types of 
political activities that are needed to transform the bureaucratic welfare 
state into a discursively mediated post-capitalist society. He attempts, 
nevertheless, to ground this program in normative standards that have 
developed coevally with the economic and political modes that he harshly 
criticizes: those of modernity. In the following paper 1 will argue that 
modern normativity is multi-dimensional, a feature ignored by Habermas 
that confounds the type of political agenda that he prescribes. In response 
I will suggest several reasons why a de-regulated form of politics is in order 
given his account of the late modern condition. 1 will also briefly highlight 
the main features of this model. * 
Habermas utilizes a theory of social evolution that demarcates 
three main phases: tribal, traditional and modern (TCA:2 156-172). The 
transition into the modern phase is characterized by decentralization of 
action orchestration through the development of both governmental and 
non-governmental subsystems. This is due partly to the emergence of a 
capitalist economy and the standardization of a monetary currency that 
serves as a medium of exchange between subsystems. The economy, as 
such, functions both as a medium of exchange between subsystems. The 
economy, as such, functions both as a subsystem and an interconnective 
substrata that coordinates relations within the subsystemic network. The 
state comes to rely on this coordinating mechanism which "forces it to 
reorganize and leads, among other things, to an assimilation of power to 
the structure of steering media: power becomes assimilated to money" 
(TCA:2 171). Hence, political power and economical power become 
inseparable. On the positive side this frees action coordination from the 
confines of traditional norms, creating the condition for rational-discursive 
political legitimation. On the negative side, the efficiency mandates of the 
capitalist economy lead to a delinguistificd mode of action coordination. 
Rather than discourse (as defined by Habermas), modernity is "steered" 
by the media money and power (TCA:2171-172). 
The prominence of steering media as coordinative devices 
weakens the capacity of the lifcworld to provide social integration. In 
Habermas* terms, the economic-political system is uncoupled from the 
1 A thorough discussion of this would require another paper featuring the 
work of Derrida and Foucault. 
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lifcworld (the "horizon and backdrop of communicative action"—TCA:2 
120): "The social system definitively bursts out of the horizon of the 
lifcworld, escapes from the intuitive knowledge of everyday 
communicative practice" (TCA:2 173). While structural differentiation 
within the lifcworld (due to increased rationalization) delineates the 
domains appropriate to the three types of validity claims raised in 
consensual communication (those pertaining to truth, truthfulness and 
righlncss) it likewise gives rise to increasingly complex systemic structures 
that tend to rope off or "colonize" the lifeworld. Consequently, the lifcworld 
becomes an ever shrinking subsystem, limiting its foundational role in 
action coordination. From the former aspect of rationalization emerges a 
system of abstract law and increased demand for consensual political 
legitimation; from the latter, a propensity for steering media to infringe 
upon institutional domains (political, legal, etc.) that depend on highly 
developed communication structures (TCA:2 173-78)2 
More recent developments in the capitalist economy (specifically 
the expansion of the welfare state) have intensified this problem. The 
"utopian energies" of modernity have decreased while steering media 
have become predominant. Habermas labels this "the new obscurity" 
which "is part of a situation in which the program of the social welfare 
state, which still feeds on the Utopian energy of a laboring society, is losing 
its capacity to project future possibilities for a collectively better and less 
endangered way of life" (TNO 3-5). 
Habermas proposes as a solution to this problem that existing 
political channels be bypassed as their communication structures are 
thoroughly distorted. The subsystemic media steered spheres must be 
transformed by autonomous collectivities that root themselves in what 
rcmainsd the lifcworld. Of existing means for social regulation—money, 
power and solidarity-solidarity needs to be positioned above the other 
two. This involves drawing upon the communicative capacity that is latent 
in the structures of the lifcworld. Habermas maintains that doing so will 
^Habermas seeks to develop a theory of the lifeworld that avoids the 
subjective pitfalls of the phenomenological model developed by Shutz and 
Luckmann. "Like Husserl, they begin with the cgological consciousness 
for which the general structures of the lifcworld are given as necessary 
subjective conditions of the experience of a concretely shaped, historically 
stamped, social lifeworld" (TCA:2, page 129). The strength of this position 
is that the lifcworld is conceived as a socio-historically developed 
backdrop for action. The chief problem lies with the assumption that the 
acting subject is fundamental. In contrast, Habermas argues, the subject 
is always formed in contexts of intersubjectivity that arc rooted in the 
communicative structures of the lifcworld. As such, the lifcworld serves as 
n pool of already given resources that can be thematized in validity claims. 
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"influence the boundaries between communicatively structured areas of 
life, on the one hand, and the state and the economy, on the other", 
purportedly encouraging the development of communication oriented 
utopic visions of emancipation (TNO 14-17). 
While quite attractive on a purely theoretical level, even 
Habermas recognizes that there is little chance for this to serve as a viable 
practical solution to late modern crises or pathologies. "If 1 am not 
mistaken, the chances for this today are not very good. More or less in the 
entire Western world, a climate has developed that furthers capitalist 
modernization processes as well as trends critical of cultural modernism" 
(MP 13). In my estimation the problem lies in the very modern 
normativity that Habermas claims holds the solution to the 
aforementioned situation. His system/lifeworld distinction creates the 
illusion that the normative content of modernity is located exclusively in 
the lifeworld, making it the source pool from which progressive political 
activity must draw its energy. In contrast to this, I will argue that modern 
normativity is considerably more complex than Habermas acknowledges: 
that there are several levels of normativity that operate interdependently, 
preserving and transforming the systemic network that Habermas aptly 
describes. If my argument is correct, this situates the need for a different 
mode of political activism than that suggested by Habermas: one that is in 
a sense "deregulated". By relying on the questionable normative content 
of modernity Habermas (apparently by his own recognition) renders a 
complimentary practice implausible. 
As I mentioned, for Habermas, the communicative structures of 
the lifeworld are the exclusive source of modern normativity. Modern 
lifeworld differentiations correspond to the components of speech-acts. 
The cultural sphere corresponds to propositional content; the societal 
sphere corresponds to illocutionary content; and the personal sphere 
corresponds to intentional content. Hence, the structures of language and 
the structures of the lifeworld are functionally interdependent. Construed 
as such, the lifeworld acts as a linguistic text: a source pool from which 
speech acts are thematized in specific contexts, providing the possibility 
for lucid communicative action coordination. The cultural sphere ensures 
semantic consistency with respect to objects in the world: so that when I 
say dog you envision a creature with four legs and a tail instead of one with 
wings and a beak. The societal sphere provides for continuity between 
spheres of action through mutual understanding: we can make the 
transition from one mode of collective activity to another. The personal 
sphere ensures that the concept of i which is produced in contexts of we 
will endure and develop from generation to generation (PDM 342-345). 
While Habermas is quick to point out that this is an idealization, 
that societies don't actually reproduce themselves in this manner, he does 
argue that formally, everything is in place to begin conducting social life 
on the basis of these lifeworld differentiations. Modernity is no longer 
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strapped by mythologically legitimated knowledge; rather, what is 
constituted as knowledge hinges on consensus among appropriately 
empowered figures (such as a community of scientists). There is also 
greater leeway for personality development, enabling increased 
individuality. Finally, the idea of universal legal and moral structures has 
developed, providing formal protection against arbitrary changes based 
on power shifts. Habermas attributes this to the realization in lifeworld 
structures of the inherent qualities of language which correspond to the 
essential aspects of modern normativity: truth, freedom and justice. 
Central to Habermas' argument is the claim that at no other time 
in the history of the West has there been so much potential for 
intcrsubjcctivc communication. Truth, freedom and justice are defined in 
terms of democratic equality, therefore providing for a consensus oriented 
public sphere that is capable of producing in practice something similar to 
the "public will". "The procedures of discursive will formation established 
in the structurally differentiated lifeworld are set up to secure the social 
bond of all with all precisely through equal consideration of the interests of 
individuals" (PDM 346). Stating this in more linguistic terms: the system 
of personal pronouns that provides the referential basis of modern 
languages finds its home in the modem lifcworld; insofar as there is 
potential for direct interchange between "I" and "I" (ego and alter), the 
establishment of a well conceived "we", one that reflects the social, 
economic and political concerns of its referent, is possible. This also 
contributes to the process of secularization as the power of discourse 
overrides that of tradition. 
While it is clear that modern theory moves in this direction, and 
that said theory is reflected in some constitutional discourses, it is 
questionable whether these discourses contribute to the establishment of 
consensus oriented polity or merely cloak the dominant modern practices 
that arc justified between the lines. Do the modem concepts of truth, 
freedom and justice have conceptual foundations in democratic equality 
or in the steering media of the modem mode of production-money and 
power (force)? If, as I will argue, the latter is the case, then the normative 
content of modernity is ambiguously related to programs of political 
action: that truth freedom and justice (which are worthy ideals) are 
normativcly conceptualized in such a way that they certify the late-modem 
practices that Habermas carefully and decries. As such, the type 
of political activity that is most appropriate to the circumstances described 
by Habermas must dismantle the convoluted normativity that has 
regulated modernity. In this sense, political action must be de-regulative. 
It is important at this point to clarify what I mean by normative. I 
use this term, as docs Habermas, to refer to the standards against which 
social, economic and political practices are measured. As such, it is crucial 
that an assessment of modern practices be factored into the evaluation of 
modern normativity. In Habermas' view, modern practices have deviated 
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from the standards to which they are accountable. Human interchange is 
driven by economical imperatives that arc coordinated through the 
steering media money and power. As a result, the system has overtaken 
almost every sphere of human life. 
The deformation of a lifeworld that is regulated, 
fragmented, monitored, and looked after are surely more 
subtle than the palpable forms of material exploitation 
and impoverishment; but internalized social conflicts 
that have shifted from the corporal to the psychic are not 
therefore less destructive. The legal-administrative 
means of translating social-welfare programs into 
actions are not some passive, as it were, propertyless 
medium. They are connected, rather, with a praxis that 
involves isolation of facts, normalization, and 
surveillance, the reifying and subjectivating violence of 
which Foucault has traced right down into the most 
delicate capillary tributaries of everyday 
communication" (PDM 362). 
Clearly such practices are not in line with freedom, justice, and truth 
unless these concepts are defined relative to another set of imperatives. 
The question that remains is whether this second set of 
imperatives deviates from or factors into modern normativity. Habermas 
himself raises this suspicion. 
In the Utopias painted in the old romances about the 
state, rational forms of life entered into a deceptive 
symbiosis with the technological mastery of nature and 
the ruthless mobilization of social labor power. This 
equation of happiness and emancipation with power and 
production has been a source of irritation for the self-
understanding of modernity from the start—and it has 
called forth two centuries of criticism of modernity (PDM 
366). 
In spite of this, Habermas clings tightly to modern normativity; it is 
foundational to the directive principles that regulate his theory of social-
political action. In contrast, 1 will argue that later modern problems such 
as those mentioned above are indeed grounded in the complex, multi-
dimensional normativity of the modern period. As such, the 
aforementioned "deceptive symbiosis" renders its normative usefulness 
suspect. My criticisms will concentrate on the three normative principles, 
freedom, justice and truth, that play such an important role in Habermas' 
defense of modern normativity. 
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Freedom is obviously not a concept that first appeared at the 
outset of the modern epoch; it has a theoretical history that spans from 
Plato to Rawls. What distinguishes the modern version, according to 
Habermas, is its univcrsalistic conceptualization. Nevertheless, universal 
freedom hasn't been the norm. Further, some of the most significant 
forms of non-frcedom-e.g. slavery, colonialism and imperialism—have 
been justified on the basis of the formal concept of freedom, with all its 
univcrsalistic abstraction, that is native to modernity. Under a given 
interpretation of the constituted formulation, all such practices can be 
justified. 
These of course are the obvious cases; ones that can in fact be 
accounted for as devianccs. The more difficult cases are those alluded to 
above: ones using power strategies to permeate all spheres of human life 
for the sake of achieving and maintaining a distinctly modern form of 
productivity. This activity relies on institutions of pedagogy, mental health, 
manufacturing, administering and rehabilitation-all justified on the basis 
of humanistic values that repeatedly appeal to the concept of universal 
freedom considered to be fundamental to modernity. With Habermas, I 
would cite Foucault as the mater analyst of these practices. I question, 
however, his (Habermas') insistent claims that such practices are 
precluded by modern norms. Rather, I would argue, the norm of freedom 
has intermingled with, and been adjusted by the systemic norm of 
productivity. This is not to say that freedom isn't a modern norm in any 
sense. My point is that the modern concept of normative freedom is 
defined and institutionalized relative to the norm of production. As such, a 
political agenda that appeals to a clear and distinct modern concept of 
freedom will be confounded by the fact that this concept has neither of 
these qualities. This being the case, modern applications of the ideal of 
freedom must be challenged by action that seeks substantive freedom 
beyond the confines of the modern production paradigm. 
As with freedom, justice was not first conceived during the 
modem period. It docs, however, purportedly ascend to rationally 
determined standards of universality in its modern form. The feature of 
modem law that appeals to Habermas is its supposed applicability across 
the full range of individuals—recognizing no special cases or exceptions. 
When objectified within a durable legal structure, these principles 
eliminate the contingencies of shifting regimes and arbitrary 
manipulations of law and order. The primary feature of this system is a 
stable center of political power—some form of republic—that can 
administer justice independent of the interests of particular 
administrators. 
Clearly this ideal hasn't been met. The exploitation of child labor, 
sexual discrimination and unfair treatment due to race, gender and 
lifestyle preference in legal courts name just a few prevalent examples. 
Those, however, as Habermas would be quick to point out, can be 
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accounted for as practices in exception to, rather than legitimated by, the 
modern concept of justice. They are not conceptual problems but rather 
stem from residual biases that can be filtered out as we become more 
"enlightened".^ 
The harder cases are those that have prevailed during the late-
modern period. These fall into two categories. The first concerns sectors 
of society that regardless of legal reforms-both systemic and individual-
arc not dealt with justly. Included in this category would be the homeless, 
single parents, working women, ethnic minorities that are politically 
neutralized due to poverty and certain classes of elderly. Habermas 
associates the plight of these groups with the welfare state in crisis: a 
function of incongruities that persist after legal adjustments have been 
made to provide for greater amounts of social and economic justice. 
There are no legal reasons why the aforementioned groups cannot achieve 
social, economic and political status equal to those from notably different 
situations. It is the very fact that formal legal justice is achieved that 
movement toward substantive justice is halted. My point is that these 
problems cannot be accounted for as deviations from modern standards 
of justice; rather, they arc supported by a concept of justice that 
intermingles with a less prominent but more powerful modern principle. 1 
will return to what this principle is after discussing the second category. 
The second category concerns those aspects of the law which 
provide advantage to sectors of the population that possess a great deal of 
power. 1 would include in this tax laws that favor the affluent, criminal laws 
that almost encourage white collar crime and laws that allow for unsafe 
levels of contaminants to be put into the environment, as well as unsafe 
additives into food products. The fact that laws have been enacted to deal 
with these problems cloaks the abusive practices which ensue. My point 
once again is that the rhetoric of equality before the law is an accomplice 
of the principle which undergirds these practices. 
The principle that I have in mind is profit. From the very 
beginning of the modern epoch an ethic of profit has been central: 
virtually any activity can find justification if it is profitable. When stated so 
bluntly this is of course offensive. Hence it is necessary to equate the 
^1 don't intend to trivialize these problems by claiming that they are 
merely exceptions to modern norms of justice. 1 consider them to be 
deeply rooted in the political economy of modernity. There are formal 
measures, however ineffective they may be, that "attempt" to address such 
situations. Therefore, it could be claimed that these are not systemically 
generated problems per sc, but rather that they represent instances of 
abuse within a fundamentally correct system. If this is the case, then 
Habermas' modernist stance is not threatened by these cases as its critical 
force is the ability to unveil such exceptions. 
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pursuit of profit with some principle of justice. This, I would argue, is the 
principle of justice that has developed in modernity. When pressure for 
legitimation becomes intensive, formally satisfying adjustments are made 
that have enough substance to quiet unrest. They don't, however, lead to 
the kind of social change that is needed to eliminate the problem. When 
justice comes into conflict with the principle of profit, the powerful sectors 
of society that thrive on profit exercise their force to preserve favored 
position. Habermas could accept this argument on the basis of his 
analysis of modernity and respond that these arc deviation from a more 
genuine sense of justice that is distinctly present in the modern lifcworld. 
My position is that this "genuine" level of justice is not as distinct as 
Habermas claims: that an analysis of late-modern practices reveals a 
conceptual interrelationship between the ideal of justice and the profit 
oriented imperatives of capitalism. Hence, an appeal to this concept of 
justice runs the risk of reinserting the normative ambiguity that has 
brought about the current predicament. 
The third component of modern normativity in Habermas' 
account is truth. Truth is primarily the product of science during the 
modern epoch and there is little doubt that science has flourished. The 
question, however, is whether it has been the quest for truth, or some other 
force, that has driven modem science. Once again, it is important to note 
that the modem sciences emerged at essentially the same time as the 
modern economy. As a result, the pursuit of truth has often been guided 
by production and profit in the form of technique. In the realm of the hard 
sciences, theoretical research is funded on the basis of potential for 
technical application, regardless of long range repercussions. This has 
brought us to the point where we are now dealing with the prospects of the 
greenhouse effect and mutually assured destruction. In the realm of the 
human sciences, technologies have been developed to shape subjects into 
useful objects in the quest for production and profit. The truth of social 
scientific discourses is measured in terms of their application; if they do 
the job, they are true. Given this, it can be argued that the modem norm 
of truth intermingles with the imperative for developing technique: it is 
conceptualized relative to technical efficacy. I am not claiming that 
science doesn't produce anything true or that all modern science has been 
driven by technical motives. Nor am I claiming that scientists aren't 
motivated by the pursuit of truth. Rather, my point is that given the type of 
truth that feeds modem systems, the norm that guides scientific research 
is inseparable from technical imperatives. This being the case, a return to 
the origin of modem normativity will run the risk of merely reestablishing 
the modern form of truth production as the norm of truth cannot be 
cleanly distinguished from technical norms. 
The arguments that I have presented are not incompatible with 
Habermas' assessment of modernity, nor his general theory that modem 
society has a bilcvel (system/lifcworld) structure. They are, however, in 
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opposition to his claim that the two levels of modern society are 
normatively distinguishable and that the lifeworld contains the last 
remaining kernels of unperverted modern normativity. My position is that 
the two levels of modem society both factor into modern normativity; and 
that the interplay between the two cloaks the operational motivation of 
numerous late-modern practices. If Habermas' view is accepted, a theory 
of social-political change must glance back to the pure normativity 
conceptualized early in the modern epoch. His appeal is to a modern 
rationality prior to its capitalistic corruption-reason that was originally a 
product of the lifeworld but which has been twisted into the service of 
system mandates. I have attempted to demonstrate that the two are 
inextricably intertwined and that remedial action should not yearn for the 
originary pristinity of enlightened (as opposed to corrupted) modernity. 
Habermas' theory of social-political action requires a normative, 
or regulative principle. My position is that social-political action has to be 
deregulative. The scenario described by Habermas in his account of late-
modem society suggests that illegitimate practices are the product of a 
complex web of relations that have developed into virtually impenetrable 
bureaucratic fortresses—literally taking on a life of their own. In order to 
change this situation, the structures that have developed need to be 
dismantled. For Habermas this involves a return to a normativity that he 
contends will serve as a wellspring of "utopian energy". I have argued that 
such a return runs the risk of being co-opted by the interplay that exists 
between lifeworld norms and system imperatives which function 
normatively. While Habermas' understanding of the linguistic-textual 
nature of both action coordination and progressive political activism is 
astute, his view that the linguistic operations of a social unit can be 
separated into categories of clear and distorted (present and non-present) 
communication is not supported by the account that he provides of late-
modern practices. Therefore, I would advocate a form of social analysis 
that concentrates on the intermingling of clear and distorted linguistic 
operations. The attendant practice would operate within the cracks 
generated by this interplay. It is here-within these residual imprints—that 
de-regulated political strategies can begin to take shape/* 
Habermas' reason for retaining a normative format that he 
recognizes to be suspect is that it provides a safeguard against political 
nihilism. The type of political action that I am advocating, which is more 
deconstructivc than reconstructive, he would claim does not. Habermas 
equates political strategies that are not principled on well conceived 
regulative standards with the anything goes ethos of fascism. This, 1 would 
4For a more thorough discussion of this point see, George A. Trey. 'The 
Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Habermas' Post-Modern 
Adventure", diacritics (summer 1989): 67-89). 
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contend, is a misconception—one that is arrested by a more rigorous 
analysis of political tcxtuality. Such analyses, along with the practices they 
support, rely on critical principles that avoid the confinement and, as I 
have tried to point out, the risks of universally instantiated norms. The 
fundamental difference between a critical principle and a norm is that the 
former is flexibly definite; it operates with conviction but is not rigid. 
Norms, on the other hand, lay claim to universality which translates into 
inflexibility. This is particularly problematic when established norms 
(such as those to which Habermas appeals) contain historically imbued 
elements which confound the achievement of the ideals that they 
represent. As such, critical principles, defined relative to scams in the 
political fabric which are vulnerable to penetrative activism, will facilitate 
the deployment of action strategics that are precluded by Habermas' 
abstract norms. Further, the risk of nihilism is offset by the checks and 
balances that the principles provide. Critical principles will by necessity 
incorporate values such as truth, freedom and justice. But, these values 
must be conceptualized relative to contexts of action rather than in terms 
of pre-established norms. Hence, the associated social-political agenda is 
not undermined by its own sense of propriety nor is it subject to the 
abusive sort of free play that Habermas envisions. 
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